
REFLECTIONS ON MEDIA SELF-REGULATION: LESSONS FOR HISTORIANS

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ABSTRACT

International human rights law places obligations on States both to refrain from interfering in the exercise of rights and to put in place a legal framework to secure rights, including rights to freedom of expression, equality, privacy and reputation. Thus States are required to ban hate speech, and to provide effective remedies for invasions of privacy and for unwarranted attacks on reputation. In the media sector, these legal remedies are often supplemented by administrative and/or self-regulatory complaints systems, whereby members of the public may submit complaints to oversight bodies where they feel the rules set out in established codes of conduct have been breached. These provide an accessible form of redress for ordinary citizens, and do so in a manner that is consistent with freedom of expression. This paper compares the legal and self-regulatory approaches for the media in the areas of hate speech, privacy and protection of reputation. It then draws some lessons from the media sector for possible self-regulation by historians, suggesting that self-regulation by the latter should not aim at providing individual remedies through a complaints system, but rather serve to articulate the values and goals of the profession.

I. INTRODUCTION

The very first article of the Constitution of the International Committee of Historical Sciences (ICHS) states, in part:

[The ICHS] shall defend freedom of thought and expression in the field of historical research and teaching, and is opposed to the misuse of history and shall use every means at its disposal to ensure the ethical professional conduct of its members.

This is a fine sounding statement, but viewing it through the eyes of a human rights lawyer, it is impossible not to advert to the fact that it is redolent with potential contradictions. On the one hand, it claims to defend freedom of expression, and yet it is opposed to the ‘misuse’ of history. Whatever it may be, it is hard to imagine that at least some, and probably most, of what qualifies as ‘misuse’ of history is protected by the right to freedom of expression. Similarly, it juxtaposes claims to defend freedom of expression and yet to ensure ethical conduct, again arguably incompatible values. Finally, it asserts boldly that it will use “every means at its disposal to ensure” ethical conduct, but it would appear that almost no such means are in fact at ICHS disposal.

1 Available at <http://www.cish.org/GB/Presentation/Constitution.htm>. All websites mentioned in this paper were accessed on 6 January 2011.
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International law includes strong human rights guarantees for freedom of expression. These guarantees are not, however, absolute and international law permits limited restrictions on this right to protect overriding public and private interests. This paper assesses three areas of legal and regulatory imposition on the right to freedom of expression which have particular relevance for historians, namely rules governing racist speech (to protect the right to equality), invasions of privacy, and defamation or libel (to protect the right to reputation). It looks, in particular, at how an appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the protection of these interests is achieved in the media sector through a mix of legal and self-regulatory systems.

The paper starts with an overview of the international law framework governing the four human rights involved, namely to freedom of expression, to equality, to privacy and to reputation. It goes on to describe the various systems used to ensure that an appropriate balance between these rights is maintained. Democratic States achieve this balance, and implement their international obligations, through a complex inter-related system of criminal, civil and administrative law. In most democracies, legal rules are supported, in relation to the media, by self-regulatory systems. Important differences between the standards prescribed by international and domestic law, and the self-regulatory and professional standards adopted by media professionals, are highlighted in the paper, as well as the different roles played by these systems. Finally, the paper discusses some of the differences between self-regulatory systems for the media and for historians, and draws some possible lessons for self-regulation for historians.

II. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

This section of the paper uses the standards set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)\(^2\), a formally binding legal treaty ratified by 167 States\(^3\), as the benchmark. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)\(^4\), as a UN General Assembly resolution, is technically of wider application but the ICCPR is legally binding and, anyway, the standards are very similar. Article 19(2) of the ICCPR guarantees the right to freedom of expression in the following terms:

Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art or through any other media of his choice.

This right is not absolute, and Article 19(3) provides for restrictions on it, subject to certain conditions, as follows:


\(^3\) As of July 2011.
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

This has been interpreted as requiring restrictions to meet a cumulative three-part test (i.e. restrictions must pass all three parts of the test)\(^5\). First, the restriction must be provided for by law. This requirement will be fulfilled only where the law is accessible and “formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct”\(^6\). Second, the restriction must be for the protection of a legitimate and overriding interest. The list of interests in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR is exclusive in the sense that these are the only interests whose protection might justify a restriction on freedom of expression.

Third, the restriction must be ‘necessary’ to protect the interest. This is the part of the test upon which the legitimacy of a restriction is usually decided, and it is therefore normally subject to greater analysis than other parts of the test in international legal cases on freedom of expression. ‘Necessary’ has been interpreted to include a number of different elements, including that there must be a “pressing social need” for the restriction, that no less intrusive alternative means exists to protect the interest, that the restriction is carefully targeted in the sense of affecting only the harmful speech, and that the restriction is not disproportionate to the aim pursued\(^7\).

The three other rights – equality, privacy and reputation – are not only recognized as legitimate grounds for restricting freedom of expression pursuant to the phrase “rights and reputations of others” found in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR, they also find explicit *positive* protection in the Covenant. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR guarantees non-discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights it proclaims in the following terms:

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

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\(^6\) *The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom*, 26 April 1979, Application No. 6538/74, paragraph 49 (European Court of Human Rights).

\(^7\) See, for example, *Lingens v. Austria*, 8 July 1986, Application No. 9815/82, paragraphs 39-40 (European Court of Human Rights).

\(^8\) These include Article 3, which reiterates the principle of equal enjoyment of rights specifically as between men and women, Article 14, guaranteeing equality before the courts, Article 24, providing for non-discrimination in measures of protection for children, Article 25, guaranteeing citizens non-discriminatory rights to take part in public affairs and elections, and Article 26, guaranteeing equality before the law.
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The ICCPR also guarantees equality in various other provisions. It may be noted that, for the most part, these are guarantees to equal enjoyment of rights, not to equal treatment or non-discrimination more generally.

Significantly, the ICCPR also includes a specific provision calling for limitations on freedom of expression to protect equality, in Article 20(2), as follows:

Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.

Article 20(2), often referred to as the ‘hate speech’ rule, is one of the few provisions in the ICCPR which calls for restrictions on freedom of expression, which implies horizontal application (i.e. protection against acts by individuals which may undermine the enjoyment of rights).

Article 17 of the ICCPR protects both against arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, and against unlawful attacks on honor and reputation. Like Article 20, it also calls for horizontal protection for these interests, in the form of legal protection against such interference or attacks (Article 17(2)). It may be noted that neither privacy nor reputation receive free-standing protection as human rights in the ICCPR, only protection against (arbitrary or unlawful) interferences or attacks. Protection against unlawful attacks – the only protection afforded to reputation – is dependent on the existence of a national law prohibiting the attack.

III. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS DOMESTICALLY

International law does not generally prescribe how States should give effect to human rights, as long as each State ensures “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” enjoyment of rights. Article 2(2) of the ICCPR does call on States to adopt legislative measures where necessary to give effect to rights, suggesting that legal means are an important, although not exclusive, means of protecting rights. A few specific rules, such as Articles 20(2) and 17(2), noted above, specifically call for the adoption of legal rules.

Legal rules can, roughly, be divided into three categories – criminal, civil and administrative – and all three are used to limit freedom of expression to protect equality, privacy and reputation. Laws prohibiting the dissemination of hate speech – speech which incites to hatred – are in most countries criminal in nature, and

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9 Although Article 26 does require the law to prohibit any discrimination and to guarantee protection against discrimination on various grounds.
10 Some of the regional human rights treaties do guarantee respect for privacy. See, for example, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), adopted 4 November 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, entered into force 3 September 1953. The European Court of Human Rights has also read a right to reputation into this guarantee. See, for example, Pfeifer v. Austria, Application No. 12556/03, 15 November 2007.
11 It might be argued that this hardly qualifies as human rights protection, since all it means is that if the legislature has passed a law, it should be respected.
12 Article 2(1) of the ICCPR.
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Article 20(2) of the ICCPR is widely understood as requiring this\textsuperscript{13}. In most countries, defamation remains a criminal offence, although in democracies this is no longer the main means of protecting reputation\textsuperscript{14}.

The primary means of protection for privacy and reputation, on the other hand, is in most countries the civil law. This leads to compensation for any wrong suffered, as well as to formal legal recognition of the wrong. Civil rules potentially also allow individuals to obtain redress in the face of racist statements. A Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe calls on States to establish a legal framework consisting of civil, criminal and administrative law provisions on racist speech, and specifically refers to using the civil law to provide compensation and a right of reply or retraction\textsuperscript{15}.

Administrative law is also used to protect all three rights. For example, in many States, licensed broadcasters are subject to legally binding codes of conduct, often administered by an independent broadcast regulator. These codes normally include rules on racist statements, as well as rules prohibiting invasions of privacy and, to some extent, attacks on reputation. Many countries also have in place data protection laws, which set rules for the collection, use and retention of data by both public and private bodies. A right of correction and/or reply may also apply in the context of an incorrect or defamatory statement.

In most countries, various self-regulatory bodies for the media exist alongside these legal regimes. While these do not satisfy those international obligations which specifically call for interests to be protected by law, they can provide important supplementary means of protecting interests like equality, privacy and reputation. Where effective, they represent useful alternatives to legal rules, in particular inasmuch as they protect the interest in question in a manner that is less intrusive in terms of freedom of expression.

There is a very close relationship between legal and self-regulatory rules. Belgian historian John Gilissen noted, in 1960, that if “historians did not develop customary rules for their profession, judges would do this in their place”\textsuperscript{16}. This has happened in rather explicit terms in relation to the media in some countries. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Press Council, a voluntary body established in 1953, was widely perceived to be ineffective. The government published the Calcutt Report in June 1990, which recommended that the press be given a limited time to establish a new self-regulatory body and, should it prove to be ineffective, a statutory press council should be established. Faced with this threat, the self-


\textsuperscript{14} See the ARTICLE 19 Defamation Maps, which illustrate which countries have done away with criminal defamation, about ten as of January 2011. Available at <http://www.article19.org/advocacy/defamationmap/map/?dataSet=defamation_legislation>.

\textsuperscript{15} Recommendation R(97)20 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on ‘Hate Speech’, 30 October 1997, Appendix, Principle 2.

regulatory Press Complaints Commission was set up shortly thereafter. It remains in place today, and it is generally considered to be relatively effective\(^\text{17}\).

Different self-regulatory systems exist in different countries but a few general remarks are pertinent. First, in most democracies complaints bodies for the print media are purely self-regulatory, while complaints bodies for the broadcast sector are usually either statutory or co-regulatory\(^\text{18}\). Second, in most countries, self-regulatory complaints bodies are established by editors, owners or publishers, and complaints are directed at media outlets (i.e. newspapers or radio/television stations) rather than at individual journalists. Journalists’ associations, on the other hand, may set ethical rules for their members, but these are not normally applied through a complaints system. It is essential to distinguish between complaints-based and ethical systems. The former aim to provide redress to the public, as well as to set minimum standards, and are usually based on an established code of conduct or practice setting out those minimum standards. The latter set ethical standards for members, including standards beyond the minimum level, but do not provide for public complaints. It is appropriate that ethical systems directed at individual journalists do not form the basis for complaints systems, since the decision to publish or broadcast is a collective decision of the media outlet, including through the editorial process, even if a piece is originally authored by an individual journalist. Third, self-regulatory systems normally involve membership bodies developing codes of conduct or practice, setting the standards which their members should respect. Complaints are assessed against these codes. Eligibility for membership in these bodies is defined by reference to type of media, normally applying to print or broadcast media outlets\(^\text{19}\). Fourth, for pure self-regulatory systems, sanctions are usually limited to a requirement to publish a statement acknowledging a breach of the code. Even these sanctions are not binding, since the only real sanction the oversight body can impose is to withdraw membership, which is in any case voluntary.

\textbf{IV. Specific Selected Standards}

This section of the paper discusses the different standards which are applied to achieve an appropriate balance between the right to freedom of expression and the protection of equality, privacy and reputation. The purpose is not so much to engage in an extensive analysis of the precise scope of permissible legal

\(^{17}\text{Although the question of effectiveness of self-regulatory bodies is a controversial one and the PCC has been subject to much criticism on this front over the years.}\)

\(^{18}\text{There are different models for co-regulation. In one version, the law provides for the formal recognition of effective self-regulatory systems. Another approach is to leave matters to professional bodies, but to provide the regulator with the power to intervene where self-regulatory systems fail to provide the required level of protection. There are many reasons for the more statutory approach to broadcast regulation, including the traditionally more hands-off approach considered appropriate in relation to regulation of the print media, and the fact that broadcasters have until recently relied on a limited public resource, the airwaves, for distribution.}\)

\(^{19}\text{The development of new forms of Internet-enabled media is starting to challenge this.}\)
restrictions on freedom of expression in these areas, as to highlight how these issues are approached through the different legal and self-regulatory systems.

To illustrate the differences between systems of regulating speech, consistent reference will be made to three specific administrative and self-regulatory systems. These are, to some extent, random choices and they certainly do not capture the large world of administrative and self-regulatory systems. At the same time, they are reasonably representative and serve to illustrate some key trends and themes. First, the Free-to-air Television Code adopted by New Zealand’s Broadcasting Standards Authority, a statutory authority20, will be used as an example of a statutory code of conduct.

Second, the Editor’s Code of Practice, adopted by the United Kingdom (UK) Press Complaints Commission (PCC), will be used as an example of a self-regulatory complaints-based system21. The Press Complaints Commission was established by the editors of various leading newspapers, and now counts as members all major newspapers published in the UK. Seventeen individuals sit on the PCC, divided among three classes: the chair, public members and press members. The chair must not be engaged, otherwise than as PCC chair, in the business of publishing newspapers, periodicals or magazines, and non-press members must hold an overall majority of the membership of the Commission.

Third, the International Federation of Journalists’ (IFJ) Declaration of Principles on the Conduct of Journalists22 will be used as an example of a set of ethical principles for individual journalists which does not include a complaints function. The IFJ is the leading global professional body for journalists, representing over 600,000 journalists in 125 countries.

RACIST SPEECH

As noted, the primary legal means for addressing hate speech in most countries is the criminal law. Clear international standards on this are set out in Article 20(2) of the ICCPR, which calls on States to prohibit advocacy of hatred that “constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”. This offence has a number of elements. It is widely understood as requiring an intention to incite, as evidenced by the term ‘advocacy’. The term ‘incitement’ has received substantial judicial attention over the years but, in essence, it imposes a requirement of a close link or nexus between the impugned expression and the prohibited outcome, namely discrimination, hostility or violence23. Finally, two of the prohibited outcomes – discrimination and violence – are concrete, and normally illegal, acts. The third – hostility or hatred – is a state of mind.

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It is likely that criminal proscriptions which go beyond the terms of Article 20(2), and certainly those which go much beyond that, would be found to represent a breach of the right to freedom of expression under international law. At the same time, some States, mostly in Europe, also ban holocaust denial, which is controversial.24

Codes of conduct, however, whether administrative or self-regulatory, often go far beyond the ‘hate speech’ standards of Article 20(2). Thus New Zealand’s Free-to-air Television Code states, in Standard 7 Discrimination and Denigration:

Broadcasters should not encourage discrimination against, or denigration of, any section of the community on account of [various grounds of discrimination].

Encouraging discrimination or denigration is, of course, a much lower standard than inciting to hatred, which means that the former rules out a wider range of speech than the latter.

Significantly, the PCC’s Code goes even further, stating, in Clause 12(i):

The press must avoid prejudicial or pejorative reference to an individual’s race, colour, religion, gender, sexual orientation or to any physical or mental illness or disability.

This is supplemented by Clause 12(ii), which provides that details regarding these sorts of characteristics should be avoided, “unless genuinely relevant to the story”. These are very wide proscriptions indeed. It may be noted that 10 of the 16 Clauses in the PCC Code may be overridden, in whole or in part, where this is in the overall public interest. Clause 12 is not one of those, so that its prescriptions apply regardless of overall public interest arguments.

Interestingly, the IFJ Principles are more muted, calling for journalists to be “aware of the danger of discrimination being furthered by the media” and to do “the utmost to avoid facilitating such discrimination” (Principle 7).

PRIVACY

In most countries, a private action exists for protection of privacy, whether directly through the civil law or, in some common law countries, through tort law or remedies such as breach of confidence.25 Courts have identified four different types of invasion of privacy: unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, appropriation of one’s name or likeness, publicity which places one in a false light and unreasonable publicity given to one’s private life.26


25 In some countries, such as France, invasion of privacy is also a criminal offence. See Article 226 of the New Penal Code.

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Rules on privacy are complicated, and vary from one jurisdiction to another. Two key notions come into play in most countries. The first is whether the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy vis-à-vis the invasive statements. This is not so much a question of whether a location is private or public – for one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in an intimate restaurant, even though this is a public place – as a wider assessment of all of the circumstances. For example, a French court held that pictures taken while the plaintiff was on a yacht violated a privacy interest, in part because the boat was not in a port or near a beach, so that its occupants had a reasonable expectation of privacy.27

Second, it is widely accepted that legally protected privacy interests may be defeated by the overall public interest. For example, a resolution of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the right of reply recommends that effective remedies be available to contest the publication of material which interferes with a privacy interest unless, among other things, publication is justified by an overriding legitimate public interest.28 The public interest is a notoriously difficult concept to define. While courts have noted that the public interest is not necessarily what the public is interested in,29 it is difficult to define the concept in a positive way.30 However, court decisions have over time put some meat on the bones of this notion.

Standard 3 Privacy, of the New Zealand Free-to-air Television Code, states, in a rather uninformative fashion: “Broadcasters should maintain standards consistent with the privacy of the individual”. However, Appendix 2 contains a set of guidelines elaborating on this and a key theme running through them is the idea that, to be an invasion of privacy, a disclosure must be “highly offensive to an objective reasonable person”. The guidelines also recognize a public interest exception to or override the protection of privacy interests. It may be noted that this actually provides more protection to free speech than the civil law in most countries, in stark contrast to the rules for hate speech.

Clause 3 of the PCC Code, entitled Privacy, states that everyone “is entitled to respect for his or her private and family life, home, health and correspondence” and that editors will be expected to justify intrusions into private life without consent. It incorporates the idea of private places being places where there is a “reasonable expectation of privacy” and allows for privacy to be overridden in the overall public interest. This is very similar to the civil law standards described above. The Code also includes a number of other provisions – such as a requirement to address cases involving grief or shock with sensitivity and ruling out the use of clandestine devices or subterfuge – which have a bearing on privacy.

29 See, for example, National Media Ltd. and Ors v. Bogoshi, 1998(4) SA 1196 (SC), at 1212 (Supreme Court of South Africa).
30 In Aubry v. Éditions Vice-Versa Inc. [1998] 1 SCR 591, paragraph 26, Canadian Supreme Court Chief Justice Lamer noted: “It is inevitable that the concept of public interest is imprecise.”
Finally, it is perhaps significant that the IJF Principles do not refer directly to privacy at all. The closest they come is in Principle 4, which states that journalists shall only use “fair methods” to obtain stories.

Defamation

As noted above, in most countries, defamation remains a criminal offence, although there have been a number of authoritative international statements suggesting that this represents a breach of the right to freedom of expression. In most democracies, the civil law is the primary means of providing redress for defamatory statements.

As with privacy, standards on defamation vary considerably from country to country, although a number of clear international standards apply. A good statement of these is contained in a Joint Declaration adopted by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression on 30 November 2000. Statements about persons, when true, should not attract liability in defamation. There is some debate as to where the onus of proof should lie in this respect. In the United States, pursuant to the rule developed in the landmark New York Times v. Sullivan case, the onus is on the plaintiff in cases involving public figures, although most countries place the onus on the defendant in all defamation cases, including those involving public figures. Opinions should either be absolutely protected, or should benefit from a greater degree of protection than statements of fact.

Perhaps the most difficult issue in defamation law is how to address incorrect and defamatory statements of fact. In the New York Times v. Sullivan case, the United States Supreme Court held that, at least in cases involving officials, the plaintiff had to prove not only falsity but also that the defendant acted with malice or with reckless disregard for the truth. In many other jurisdictions, defendants benefit from a defense of reasonable or good faith publication. This reasonable publication standard was endorsed in the Joint Declaration by the special mandates on freedom of expression noted above.

Other rules, such as a right of correction and/or reply, may apply in the context of a defamatory or incorrect statement. Indeed, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has adopted a resolution calling on States to provide for a right

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31 See, for example, the Joint Declaration of 30 November 2000 by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. Available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/hurricane/hurricane.nsf/view01/EFEE8839B169CC09C12569AB002D02C0?opendocument>.
32 See their Joint Declaration.
33 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964), 279. The special mandates on freedom of expression have taken the same position in relation to statements on matters of public interest. See their Joint Declaration.
of reply and Article 14 of the American Convention on Human Rights\textsuperscript{35} requires States to do so.

Perhaps surprisingly, codes of conduct often do not deal directly with the issue of defamation; instead, they tend to focus on accuracy and fair treatment. Thus, Standard 5 of the New Zealand Free-to-air Television Code states:

Broadcasters should make reasonable efforts to ensure that news, current affairs and factual programming:
- is accurate in relation to all material points of fact and/or
- does not mislead.

Standard 6 calls on broadcasters to “deal fairly with any person or organization”.

Clause 1 of the PCC Code similarly calls the press to “take care not to publish inaccurate, misleading or distorted information” and to correct significant inaccuracies, once identified. It also requires publications to report, fairly and accurately, the outcome of defamation cases involving them, while Clause 2 provides for an opportunity to be given to readers to reply to inaccuracies, when “reasonably called for”.

The IFJ Principles, on the other hand, take a stronger line on this. They label “malicious representation” and “calumny, slander, libel, unfounded accusations” as “grave professional offences” (see Principle 8), which presumably must be avoided. They also refer to the importance of accuracy, calling respect for the truth “the first duty of the journalist” (Principle 1), and calling for the rectification of information which is found to be “harmfully inaccurate” (Principle 5).

The promotion of accuracy by self-regulatory codes is a clear example of an area where self-regulation goes beyond what would be permitted through legal regulation. It is well established that criminal prohibitions on the publication of false news \textit{per se} (as opposed to false and defamatory statements) – even if conditioned on some negative outcome, such as fear, panic or public disorder – are not legitimate. Such rules have been struck down by leading courts in countries such as Antigua and Barbuda\textsuperscript{36}, Canada\textsuperscript{37} and Zimbabwe\textsuperscript{38}.

\textbf{ANALYSIS}

There are some important differences between rules of general application as provided for in the criminal or civil law, and more targeted standards in administrative or self-regulatory codes of conduct for the media. Under international law, the sanction to be imposed by the judge is a relevant consideration when assessing a restriction on freedom of expression. A heavy sanction may, of itself, render a restriction illegitimate, while a lighter sanction imposed on the very same expression might pass muster as a limitation on freedom

\textsuperscript{36} Hector v. Attorney-General of Antigua and Barbuda [1990] 2 AC 312 (PC).
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of expression. In the case of Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights stated that sanctions for harmful expression (in that case defamatory speech by a historian accusing a British member of parliament of war crimes) must bear a “reasonable relationship of proportionality to the injury to reputation suffered” and this should be specified in national defamation laws39.

As a result, more latitude is granted for limitations on speech where the main sanction envisaged is either a warning or a requirement to publish a statement acknowledging a breach of the rules. This may be contrasted with criminal rules – with their very harsh sanctions – and even civil rules – where large damage awards may be ordered. Similarly, the remedies of a right of correction or reply represent relatively minor intrusions into freedom of expression. In the context of a voluntary self-regulatory system, it is essentially open to the members to set the rules that govern them, although courts in the United Kingdom have held that the PCC is potentially subject to human rights rules40.

In this light, it is interesting to observe the approaches taken to racist speech, invasions of privacy and attacks on reputation. It is apparent that the various media codes take a substantially stronger position on racist speech than is common, or would, pursuant to human rights standards, be allowed in criminal or civil laws. On the other hand, standards in the various codes on privacy and reputation are either similar to or less protective than the civil (or sometimes criminal) law. Indeed, while codes do deal with privacy, they hardly protect reputation, except as ancillary to the duty to strive for accuracy in reporting.

This can probably be explained by reference to the role of the media in society. The drafters of the codes, for the most part media professionals, recognize the scourge of racism, which has played such a considerable role in twentieth-century history, and believe that the media should at the very least not be part of the problem. Importantly, imposing stringent rules in relation to racist speech rarely comes into conflict with the public interest and thus with media’s ‘fourth estate’ or watchdog role41.

The matter is very different as regards privacy and reputation. In these cases, there is a potential conflict with the role of the media in informing the public on matters of public interest. This poses a thorny problem for complaints bodies because there are significant problems in relation to both of these rights with yellow or sensational journalism, which does not make a public interest contribution and which is exactly where complaints bodies are expected to play a moderating role. They tend to strike this balance through the mechanism of the public interest override, thereby allowing informative programming which is intrusive in terms of privacy and reputation, but showing less tolerance for sensational pieces which are similarly intrusive.

41 Although the PCC rule on mentioning race or other characteristics is overridden where this is relevant to the story.
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Administrative or self-regulatory complaints systems thus offer a number of benefits. In some areas – notably protection of equality but also regarding accuracy – self-regulatory rules establish more stringent limitations on free speech than would be allowed through the criminal or civil law. Even where they do not set higher standards, they provide a far more accessible remedy for individuals than the courts. Finally, they provide, at least for attacks on reputation, a remedy which is particularly well-suited to redressing the harm done, namely a corrective statement effectively withdrawing the earlier, unwarranted statement.

V. Some possible lessons for self-regulation by historians

What can historians learn from these media experiences with self-regulation? It is obvious, but still pertinent, to note that legal rules of general application – including criminal and civil laws – apply equally to historians as to others engaging in public acts of expression. Historians are thus prohibited from publishing hate speech, invading privacy without a public interest justification, or making unwarranted attacks on reputation.

There are a number of differences between the media and historians that render the latter less suitable for complaints-based self-regulatory systems. A key difference between journalists and historians is that the former have historically distributed their work through clearly identifiable organs – newspapers, and television and radio stations – so that regulation can attach, as it were, to those organs42. In practice, as noted, most complaints-driven self-regulatory systems apply to media outlets, not to individual journalists. The situation is different with historians, who disseminate their work primarily as individuals (except when they write officially commissioned histories), and through journals and books. One might try to attach a code to the publishers of these journals and books, but only some of them specialize in historical works. Furthermore, their relationship with the content they publish is fundamentally different from that of media outlets. They are unlikely to be willing to take responsibility for it in the same way that editors do for media content43.

Second, and related, it is likely to be more difficult to define those subject to complaints for historians than it is for the media. For most complaints systems, membership or scope is defined by reference to media outlets (newspapers, television, radio). But even for individual systems, such as the IFJ rules, journalists can be defined by reference to a well-defined entity, the media, i.e. as individuals who regularly contribute to the content of media output. Defining historians is more difficult. It is possible to devise a definition based on work – such as academic historians, teachers, writers – but this will inevitably leave out many

42 This is changing with new means of distributing content, for example via the Internet and mobile phones, and the emergence of new forms of media, such as bloggers.
43 This is for the best as otherwise publishers would be tempted to trench on academic freedom.
individuals who can legitimately claim to be historians, and for whom the rationale for self-regulation would be similar.

Third, and again related, it is not clear what sort of remedies might be imposed on historians, apart from a public warning and/or suspension or expulsion from a professional body. Perhaps this is sufficient. But in the media sector, the remedy of requiring the media outlet to print or broadcast a statement acknowledging the wrong is available. This often provides a sort of direct redress, since it was publication of an earlier statement that caused the harm in the first place. As noted, this is particularly effective as redress for harm to reputation. This remedy is not evidently available for historians.

On the other hand, while historians as a group may do serious harm, for example by propagating widely a false or politically biased notion of history, individual historians, or specific historical publications, are less likely to cause harm than major media outlets. There are a number of reasons for this, including the usually relatively limited scope of distribution of their work, the lack of similar direct incentives to invade privacy and engage in undue criticism which apply to the media, and the more academic nature of their work, which affects readership and how readers understand and use their work. This is perhaps why, notwithstanding Gilissen’s claim that absent the development of customary rules, the State will regulate historians, this does not appear to have happened in practice, whereas it has in the case of the media.

Historians may want to consider a further point when developing codes of conduct. The better complaints-driven codes have two intrinsic qualities. First, the standards they espouse are cast in such a way that it is possible to evaluate, reasonably objectively, whether or not they have been respected. It is significant that most, if not quite all, of the provisions in media codes have some parallel in the general law. Even the IFJ Principles, which are not designed to be used to evaluate complaints, articulate, for the most part, fairly precise and measurable standards, such as reporting only in accordance with facts of which the origin is known, using fair methods to obtain news and respecting professional secrecy regarding confidential sources.

Second, a code designed to underpin a complaints system should set out minimum standards of required conduct. It tells the public what they may expect of those bound by the code (the members, in the case of the media often newspapers or broadcasters), and that, should members fail to respect the code, the individuals might complain and obtain some sort of redress. For standards that are more context dependent, media codes often include some sort of public interest override or other qualifier (“take care not to publish inaccurate statements”, give a “fair opportunity to reply”, both from the PCC Code). This allows the oversight body to assess whether or not a given practice falls below minimum acceptable standards.

Neither the American Historical Association’s Statement on Standards of

44 Where such activities often directly boost sales.
Toby Mendel

Professional Conduct\(^{45}\), nor the Code of Ethics for Historians proposed by Antoon De Baets (which applies to academic historians)\(^{46}\), meets these two criteria for complaints-based codes. Both are qualitatively different in nature from the types of standards found in the media codes and, in particular, are more aspirational and even moral in nature. Thus, the former posits that historians should trust and respect their peers, practice with integrity and be aware of their biases, and De Baets’s Code is similar in nature. These are strong statements of principle, but they are neither objectively measurable nor minimum standards of behavior. Of course some provisions in these codes, such as not plagiarizing the work of others, are both measurable and minimum standards\(^{47}\), but most are not.

It is submitted that inasmuch as these standards are primarily aspirational goals rather than specific minimum standards, they are not appropriate as a basis for complaints. Such standards, which point to ideal or better practices which members should strive to attain but which they will not always manage to meet, are inherently incompatible with standards as a basis for complaints. Aspirational standards give direction, rather than set a minimum floor of acceptable behavior\(^{48}\).

De Baets posits a number of benefits from a code of ethics for historians, including to serve as the focus of moral awareness, to formulate the rights and duties of historians, to adjudicate conflicts, to teach the core of the profession to history students, to clarify the foundations and limits of the historical profession, to protect historians against pressure, and as a compass to detect and also prevent irresponsible uses and abuses of history\(^{49}\). The above suggests that the codes that do exist are not appropriate for the adjudication of conflicts, although they may serve to promote the other benefits, which are certainly not unimportant.

VI. Conclusion

Journalists and historians share a key attribute: they are both professional social communicators. Both enjoy certain core human rights – most notably the right to freedom of expression – and both have professional values that (should) constrain them in their work. But the manner in which they have given effect to their professional values has so far been quite different. Whereas journalists have in most countries been subject to administrative or self-regulatory complaints


\(^{46}\) De Baets, Responsible History, 188-196.

\(^{47}\) It is perhaps significant that when the American Historical Association was still processing complaints, most involved allegations of plagiarism. De Baets, Responsible History, 181.

\(^{48}\) When the American Historical Association stopped investigating complaints against historians in 2003, the reasons it gave were a lack of funds and its inability to impose sanctions, De Baets, Responsible History, 181. I wonder whether an unrecognized, but not irrelevant, reason was the inherent problem of seeking to decide complaints based on aspirational goals rather than minimum standards.

\(^{49}\) De Baets, Responsible History, 187-188.
systems, normally applied to the media outlets which carry their work, historians in only a few countries have developed professional codes. These have operated less as binding sets of rules than as goal-oriented statements of the principles to which the profession should aspire.

This is probably as it should be. Works distributed through the media have a great potential to cause harm, and there is a strong motive for the media to engage in unacceptable invasions of privacy or unduly harsh criticism, namely to attract an audience. It is important for members of the public to have some redress against these wrongs. For historians, however, the rationale for providing redress beyond that already provided for by law is less strong. For them, codes of conduct are more important as statements – to historians, to students of history and to the general public – of the deeply held values and goals of the profession.

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